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Abstract 
This article examines German national renewal following defeat in the First World War. It 
emphasizes the importance of a ‘unique’ German culture, particularly the music dramas of 
Richard Wagner, in the politics of pan-German nationalists, Hitler, and the National Socialist 
Party. Hitler believed national revival depended on the rebirth of German culture, a concept 
that predated the war and was popular in völkisch circles and the radical right. Hitler owed his 
rise from obscurity as much to his appeal to cultural longings, which enabled him to attract 
the attention of Bavaria’s elite, as he did to his political ideas and abilities. 
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The end of the Great War came as a shock to most Germans, and while the armistice stopped 
the fighting, it did not end their suffering. Wartime hardships continued and were worsened 
by domestic political turmoil, revolution, and violence. The Kaiser and the traditional 
conservative political order were gone. In their place the extreme politics of communist 
revolutionaries and right-wing paramilitary groups vied with each other to fill the void 
created by the war’s end and the peace settlement.  Neither offered lasting solutions to the 
deep divisions and multitude of problems that beset post-war Germany. Many Germans were 
bewildered by the extraordinary turn of events, and they questioned how all of this had 
happened. The left and the right exploited the Dolchstoβlegende (stab in the back legend) to 
explain defeat in 1918 and the harsh peace imposed by the western democracies. Germany’s 
failings were also seen by some, pan-German nationalists and conservative south German 
Catholics, as resulting from metaphysical or spiritual illness. They believed a deep cultural 
malaise along with miscegenation accounted for both defeat in the war and the many 
privations that accompanied the ‘shameful peace treaty’ of Versailles. Solipsistic in their 
collective misery, many Germans yearned for the emergence of a strong leader—a Führer—
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who would revive the German spirit, end their humiliation and suffering, and restore 
Germany’s strength and greatness.1 
 
Germany’s military defeat was accompanied by a political and social revolution which had 
profound if unexpected effects on national revival. Recovery would not come from the 
political and economic elites. It would not be the result of an intensified and revised Prussian 
militarism or public support for a policy of aggressive imperialism, but rather the rebirth of 
an exclusive German national community founded on a commonly shared ethnocentric 
culture.  Public interest in the old German past had surged before the war, reflecting a rise in 
German nationalism and a growing belief, especially among the radical right, that a unique 
German culture defined the German nation and strengthened the German state. These views, 
loosely interpreted, attracted Germans of many different political persuasions and social-
economic circumstances after the war.
2
 One early post-war advocate of German cultural 
regeneration was Adolf Hitler, an obscure ultranationalist politician in the confusing and fluid 
political milieu of 1919 Munich. Hitler believed Germany would be great again once it 
became a truly united country, in his view, something it had never fully been either during the 
1914-1918 war or even after unification in 1871. Class, confession, party and regional 
divisions all had to be swept away and replaced by a German national consciousness that had 
inner spiritual strength capable of uniting the people. For Hitler, this was attainable only 
through a revered and widely shared German culture, beginning with core German artistic 
values, as portrayed in the great music dramas of Richard Wagner. Harnessing Kunst und 
Kultur (art and culture)—German art and German culture—in the service of national 
regeneration and unity was a significant part of Hitler’s answer to solving Germany’s 
historical weakness and establishing a solid spiritual foundation on which to rebuild the 
country after the disasters of 1918 and 1919.
3
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As early as November 1919, Hitler argued forcefully in the newly formed Programme 
Committee of the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP, German Workers’ Party) for Germany’s 
spiritual rebirth before any renewed military mobilisation.
4
 Initially, Hitler received muted 
support from his new political colleagues for his radical ideas on cultural rebirth as an 
essential pre-requisite for national revival. Undeterred he persisted with his firm belief that by 
concentrating first on spiritual regeneration Germany would not only recover from her recent 
failures, but would also emerge stronger and better prepared to achieve her historic destiny as 
a great power, in much the same way that Richard Wagner transformed his early career 
failure in Paris into national and international triumph in Bayreuth and around the world. 
Hitler saw in Wagner a pure German nationalist of unbending will and a genius whose art had 
the power to unite all Germans through a shared Deutschtum (Germanness). Hitler’s views on 
national rebirth first found enthusiastic support amongst post-war Munich’s cultural elite and 
later political endorsement from the guardians of Wagner’s legacy in Bayreuth. 5  This article 
examines the role of Wagner and his concept of spiritual regeneration in Hitler’s 
Weltanschauung (world view) and the importance of art and culture in Germany’s rebirth 
after the First World War. It also demonstrates that Hitler owed his rise from obscurity as 
much to his appeal to cultural longings, which enabled him to attract the attention of 
influential members of Bavaria’s elite, as it did to his political ideas and abilities.   
 
The historiography on the Wagner-Hitler nexus is extensive but, as Celia Applegate and Hans 
Rudolf Vaget have demonstrated, it is not representative of the highest standards of 
scholarship.
6
 Applegate is so distressed by the ‘various ill-considered, assumption-ridden 
theories of musical Sonderweg (special path),’ explaining Hitler through Wagner, that she has 
called for ‘a moratorium on all discussions of the Meister [of Bayreuth] and the Führer.’7 The 
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problem for both Applegate and Vaget is that too many historians have taken considerable 
shortcuts in their eagerness to draw a direct causal link between Wagner’s concepts of 
German musical superiority, Germanness, and his vituperative anti-Semitism, and Hitler’s 
aggressive racial and military policies that ended with the Holocaust. Vaget states that this 
‘scapegoating’ of Wagner began in 1939 with the work of Peter Viereck, and has continued 
almost unabated with the work of such established historians as Robert Gutman, Hartmut 
Zelinsky, Paul Lawrence Rose, Marc Weiner, Joachim Köhler, and Alexander Schmidt.
8
 
Köhler has the added distinction of taking this argument to its most extreme conclusion, by 
claiming that Hitler was merely the executioner of Wagner’s ideas, who turned his idol’s 
operatic mythologies into a hellish political and social reality. 
 
Given the clear warnings noted above, how does this article avoid the errors committed by 
previous historians writing on Wagner and Hitler, and what new contribution does it make? 
One of its objectives is to explore how Hitler’s fascination with Wagner influenced his early 
political career. Instead of looking for Hitler in Wagner, this article examines how Hitler and 
his supporters embraced and then reconstructed Wagner for their own purposes. It also 
examines the right-wing nationalist interpretation of Wagner’s doctrine of regeneration as 
articulated by Houston Stewart Chamberlain. This process began before the Great War 
commenced and intensified after its conclusion. Wagner’s family, the disaffected right, and 
the cultural elite (‘intellectual aristocrats’)9 in Munich and Berlin also played their part in 
promoting German art and German culture, particularly Wagner’s art, as the essential factor 
in restoring German greatness after the calamity of the First World War. 
 
Richard Wagner’s prominent place among the most significant composers is undisputed, even 
by his most ardent critics and enemies. His operas, as Bryan Magee declares, ‘are among the 
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very greatest works of art that there are.’10 Wagner had the highest intellectual ability, which, 
along with his many interests, led Ernest Newman to write: ‘Such a combination had never 
existed in a single individual before; it has never happened since, and in all probability it will 
never happen again.’11 Newman’s praise was echoed more recently by Peter Watson, who 
agrees with Friedrich Nietzsche that ‘Wagner was by far the fullest human being.’12 It was 
Wagner’s ability to cross many boundaries, in his life and his work, which accounts for why 
many people—past and present—have regarded him an incomparable genius. 
 
Wagner is also renowned for controversy. Chronic financial difficulties, scandalous affairs, 
his apparent shift from left-wing revolutionary to right-wing nationalist, his much publicised 
anti-Semitism and hatred of the French (both crystallized during his early career failures at 
the Paris opera) illustrate a more complex and fallible side to Wagner’s character. His actions 
and his thoughts, however, at least in his mind, were predominantly cultural.
13
 For example, 
his anti-Semitism was erratic, personal (a persecution mania that Jewish critics conspired to 
destroy his art and his career) and typical (in style, if greater in degree) of nineteenth century 
European society. Throughout his life Wagner maintained many Jewish friends. Hermann 
Levi, who conducted the premier of Parsifal, regarded him as “the best and noblest of 
men.”14 Similarly broad parameters applied to Wagner’s thoughts on German nationalism.  
Romantic idealism shaped many of these thoughts, but so did personal and practical 
considerations.  Wagner hankered after a proud and united Germany that conformed to his 
romanticized view of England and France, although he hated the latter because of Napoleon, 
French airs of superiority, and his own unsuccessful two and a half years in Paris from 1839 
to 1842.  He also appreciated the financial rewards that would come from an annual national 
festival dedicated to performing his music.
15
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National and international success later in Wagner’s career confirmed his contempt and 
hardened his intolerance for Jews and the French. Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg (1868) 
unintentionally became his answer to his Jewish enemies and the French. Meistersinger was 
an overt celebration of Germanness, and ‘a glorification of German art, above all German 
music.’ It was also a personal statement of salvation and regeneration and what Wagner 
hoped a new united Germany would become (through his art). Nietzsche saw in all of 
Wagner’s music, but particularly in Meistersinger, a unique German cheerfulness, as well as 
the power to regenerate and unite. He perceived in Wagner’s romantic music an uncanny 
ability to heal the emotional and psychological wounds of those who had suffered profoundly 
from life’s injustices, a characteristic that Nietzsche found deeply disturbing.  Nietzsche also 
fretted over the hypnotic mass appeal of Wagner’s richly textured music.16 
 
Wagner was enthusiastic about ideas, specifically the pessimistic, world-rejecting philosophy 
of Arthur Schopenhauer. He claimed to have read Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung (‘The world as will and representation’) four times in less than a year between 
1854 and 1855. Nietzsche recognized the heavy influence of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics in 
Die Meistersinger stating: ‘we stand before a development in the innermost recesses of 
Wagner’s own soul.’17 Wagner’s disillusionment with politics and the world led him to 
embrace Schopenhauer’s philosophy wholeheartedly. He adopted Schopenhauer’s argument 
that art, and specifically music, was a refuge from the world and a source of redemption and 
rebirth.
18
 Music unlike any of the other arts is something that is felt, not represented as is a 
painting, a poem, or a sculpture. It is a metaphysical voice that has the power to transcend the 
everyday and transport us inwardly ‘away from the struggle for life.’19 Wagner did not, as 
Joachim Köhler contends, cease to be a left-wing revolutionary and become a right-wing 
proto-fascist. After absorbing Schopenhauer, he moved away from politics and 
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enthusiastically embraced metaphysics.
20
 Politics, however, followed Wagner as he gained 
domestic and international popularity.  
 
The first Bayreuth Festival from 13 to 30 August 1876 amplified Wagner’s worldwide fame. 
Crowned heads of Europe, other luminaries, and leading artists from all over the world 
attended three cycles of Der Ring des Nibelungen (‘The ring of the Nibelung’). Wagner was 
an undisputed national and international celebrity, and a symbol of Otto von Bismarck’s 
triumphant new Germany. His official relationship with Bismarck and the future Kaiser, 
Wilhelm II, however, was short and unsatisfactory, because neither of the two Prussian 
leaders had much time for, nor understanding of, art.
21
 This was not the case in pan-German 
societies and other nationalist groups. For them, Wagner was an exemplar of Germanness, 
and his works were testaments of German cultural superiority, which fed their fanatical ideas 
on Aryan concepts of race, a return to hereditary soil, and an aggressive German 
imperialism.
22
 Nietzsche feared (and later detested) the mass appeal and misinterpretation of 
Wagner’s art, particularly after 1861, when he heard the piano reductions of Tristan und 
Isolde (1865), an opera he thought would drive people mad because of its emotional 
intoxication. He understood what Wagner had done—the composer was philosophizing with 
sound.
23
 Wagner’s music had the power to move people’s emotions, and in his later operas 
some heroic characters, such as Siegfried, in the Ring, and Parsifal, the pure, noble, and 
divine leader in the opera of the same name, were easily confused by ultranationalists with a 
more calculated political and German nationalist persona.
24
 It was precisely this effect—
providing inspiration and a sense of unity ‘on the mass, on the immature, on the blasé, on the 
idiots, on Wagnerians’—that Nietzsche feared.25 
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After Wagner’s death in 1883, the association of him and German nationalism continued and 
intensified, a process that was strongly encouraged by his family—mainly his widow Cosima 
and his son-in-law, author and völkisch philosopher Houston Stewart Chamberlain—as well 
as his close friends and associates in Bayreuth. For financial and political reasons they hailed 
Wagner’s operas as national cultural treasures that had to be protected against foreign 
defilement. Between 1900 and 1913, a series of highly public and unsuccessful legal battles 
to extend the copyright of Wagner’s earlier operas and to preserve Bayreuth’s exclusive 
privilege to perform Parsifal, Wagner’s last opera, not only raised the emotional temperature 
concomitant with notions of Wagner’s unique Germanness but for the intellectual aristocrats 
also served as a portent of dark days to come for a spiritually weak nation surrounded by 
aggressive, avaricious, and unscrupulous enemies.
26
 This in turn reflected how they viewed 
what it meant to be German. 
 
The anxieties that many Germans felt over their national identity and national unity in the late 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 Centuries were salient features in the troubled history of their newly 
unified state and contributory factors to the causes of the First (and the Second) World War.
27
 
Irrespective of the reasons the Kaiser and his generals and government ministers had for 
going to war in 1914, most Germans believed the war was an act of self-defence, a struggle 
for the survival of Germany or, in words made famous by Thomas Mann, the inevitable battle 
between ‘French civilisation and German Kultur.’28 Germans believed the war they were 
fighting was for a just and noble cause. Defeat in November 1918 came as a severe shock. 
Even that shock was soon overshadowed by hardship and deprivation, unprecedented 
financial crises, national humiliation and international condemnation. Few would have 
believed Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, when he warned: ‘There is a danger that this war 
that has been forced upon us may end in a peace that will do the utmost harm to our 
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people.’29 Tirpitz was the Secretary of State of the German Imperial Naval Office until March 
1916 when he resigned over the Kaiser’s decision to limit submarine warfare. In 1917 he 
along with Heinrich Claβ, the leader of the Pan-German League and the editor of the 
Alldeutsche Blätter (‘Pan-German Journal’) and the Deutsche Zeitung (‘German 
Newspaper’), founded the conservative and nationalist Deutsche Vaterlandspartei (German 
Fatherland Party), which all of the members of the Wagner family joined. 
 
As Tirpitz’s prophesied, the war and its immediate aftermath brought significant challenges 
and heartache to most Germans. In Bayreuth, Winifred and Siegfried Wagner, the British 
born Germanophile daughter-in-law and the only son of Richard and Cosima Wagner, 
struggled to provide for their young family.
30
 They also watched nervously, as did most 
Germans, the birth of the new republic, and the direction it was headed under Friedrich Ebert, 
its first Chancellor and leader of the Social Democratic Party. Winifred, who no longer spoke 
English and had renounced Britain because of the war, could have been speaking for many of 
her new and disillusioned countrymen and -women when she described the political triumph 
of the left-wing republicans in a letter to her friend Helena Boy: ‘My God, who would have 
thought that such a turn of events was possible! How proud we were of our German 
Fatherland, and how ashamed we are that a worm at the core could produce such 
degradation.’31 The ‘worm at the core’ was Ebert and the Social Democrats. 
 
Support for Ebert’s government and the Republic was further weakened by the harsh 
conditions of the armistice, and by the Bolshevik revolutions and counter-revolutions led by 
the Freikorps and the Right.
32
 Out of this turmoil emerged the Dolchstoβlegende (stab-in-the-
back legend). It held that the undefeated army had been betrayed by Communists and Jews, 
that revolution, the unfair peace settlement, and the destruction of German traditions and 
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values had been brought about by enemies of the fatherland who had destroyed the German 
Reich to gain power themselves. Bolshevism quickly became a catch-all condemnation for 
left-wing politicians, pacifists, the liberal press, Jews, and anyone else who could be blamed 
for Germany’s defeat and post-war problems. The term was also used to stigmatize new 
trends in art, architecture, literature, and music. Atonal music, Cubism, Dadaism, Futurism, 
anything that was modern and experimental was deemed to be an assault on traditional 
German cultural life. Art, ‘all great art’, as Hitler would later proclaim, ‘is national’ and 
therefore had to be protected.
33
 Nationalists and traditionalists, as well as a growing number 
of middle-class Germans, feared the end of the German Reich and German art, and even the 
German nation writ large. These fears are expressed well by Ernst Hanfstaengl, the Harvard 
educated half-German, half-American art dealer, friend of Adolf Hitler, and later foreign 
press secretary in Hitler’s National Socialist government. Hanfstaengl spent the war in 
America. When he returned to Munich in July 1921, the near destitution and political turmoil 
that he experienced left him ‘looking back to the happier days of Ludwig II and Richard 
Wagner.’34 Many Germans began to yearn for a return to a familiar Heimat, a sense of home 
and homeland, and there was a growing commitment to Germanness and the notion of a 
Volksgemeinschaft (national community).
35
 Fighting against the Bolsheviks and the socialists 
became increasingly intertwined with fighting for the nation and its Kultur.
36
 
 
The stab in the back legend also reinvigorated the anti-Semitic beliefs and exclusionist 
political agendas of German ultranationalists, conservative south German Catholics, and 
members of the various pan-German organisations.
37
 They blamed Jewish Bolshevism from 
the east and Jewish dominated capitalism in the west for most of Germany’s problems. 
Defeat and national disintegration following the armistice were viewed as the natural 
consequences of a moral and spiritual decline brought about by foreign influences and Jews. 
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Nationalists and Catholics produced a flurry of pamphlets and popular books citing a Jewish 
and foreign contagion that had eaten away at German culture, German values, and ‘true 
Germanness’. To combat this disease, they called for a reawakening of spiritual idealism and, 
depending on the group, either a new monarchy or a new type of strong moral leader.
38
 
Writing to Prince Ernst zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg, Cosima Wagner shared these views: ‘as 
always and everywhere it is the Semitic element that is responsible for agitation and 
subversion.’39 The Wagners were nationalists and they provided support to those who fought 
for the old German values and order, in art and the state. They believed that a decisive leader 
and a strong authoritarian government were needed to halt the degenerative forces that were 
tearing Germany apart. After reading General Erich von Ludendorff’s memoirs, Cosima felt 
that he was the man to save Germany. In another letter to Hohenlohe-Langenburg, she wrote: 
‘Ah, if only Ludendorff could be our dictator.’40 
 
Cosima’s sentiments, though not her choice of a new national leader, were shared by the 
remnants of the general staff in Berlin as it struggled to rebuild the army and through it 
restore Germany to a great power status. General Walther Reinhardt, chief of the Army 
Command after the disbandment of the Great General Staff,
41
 believed national renewal 
depended on the reform and regeneration of the army. Historical precedent supported his 
view. Reinhardt was inspired by earlier Prussian military reformers—Clausewitz, Gneisenau, 
and Scharnhorst
42—who rebuilt the army and the nation following defeat in the Napoleonic 
Wars. He concluded that recovery would come from the state drawing on the power of the 
Volk (the people) united in a common purpose. The purpose was the ‘life-threatening struggle 
for [Germany’s] existence’ and this required large military forces capable of waging and 
winning a Volkskrieg (people’s war) as well as a government committed to supporting the 
army in its historic role. Reinhardt approved of the new Weimar Republic, and the significant 
12 
 
benefits that could be had from a competent civilian bureaucracy dedicated to assisting the 
army, particularly in raising and collecting taxes that would fund both military reforms and 
the army’s expansion. What was required to make it all work, according to Reinhardt and 
many of his fellow generals in the clandestine general staff,
43
 was a strong and charismatic 
leader who promoted military values and who could be trusted to provide decisive leadership 
in war.
44
 
 
Cultural and spiritual rebirth and other völkisch ideas on national regeneration were not 
matters that occupied the generals’ attention. Led by General Wilhelm Groener, deputy chief 
of staff, they focused their efforts on learning the lessons of the Great War and reconstructing 
the army.
45
 Reinhardt, however, acknowledged the importance of national unity to Groener’s 
reforms and the army’s future expansion.  He believed that army reform and national support 
for the army were the essential pre-requisites if Germany was to recover and regain its former 
glory and status in the world. Germans, he urged, had to count on Germans and not look to 
alliances or foreign elements within the Reich for their salvation. ‘The danger of Bolshevism 
for Germany,’ warned Reinhardt ‘is not to be dismissed or underestimated.’46 National unity 
for Reinhardt was based on military purpose and military service that generated the full 
militarization of German society. His views were more extreme than those of General Hans 
von Seeckt, chief of staff of the Truppenamt, but they were endorsed by other senior army 
officers, including General Groener and General Kurt von Schleicher, a protégé of von 
Seeckt.
47
 Many nationalists and right-wing organizations loosely grouped together in the 
Völkischer Bund (German Nationalist League) also wanted a strong leader and a strong 
military, but they regarded the army more as a product of national unity, not the source of its 
creation. National renewal required cultural and spiritual regeneration. One of the leading 
promoters of this belief was Houston Stewart Chamberlain. 
13 
 
 
Chamberlain was one of Germany’s most recognized and successful völkisch writers.  
Ironically he was the son of a British admiral, and the son-in-law of Richard and Cosima 
Wagner, having married their youngest daughter, Eva, in 1908. He was also the intellectual 
leader of Wahnfried, the Wagner’s family home in Bayreuth, and the Bayreuther Kreis 
(Bayreuth Circle), an active and influential group of pan-German intellectuals, editors and 
writers who promoted Wagner’s ideas and work.48 Wagner’s music converted Chamberlain 
into a spiritual idealist with a deep love of German culture. He repaid his debt to Wagner by 
writing a substantial and widely-read biography of him and other works that explained the 
unique German spirit that had been resurrected through his Gesamtkunstwerk (total art 
work).
49
 Chamberlain’s Wagner was an idealist and a Romantic, a purely German character 
who believed that German culture had a historic destiny, a destiny shaped by music, 
particularly Wagner’s music. Writing about Wagner’s dream before the war, Chamberlain 
claimed that what Wagner wanted most of all, and ‘to which he devoted his life, was a single, 
strong Germany, in contradistinction to the impotent confederation’ of little states and 
squabbling peoples. In this dream the glory of Wagner’s united ‘German fatherland was, not 
that it should rule the world, but that it should ennoble and redeem the world’ through the 
superiority of German art.
50
 The overt German nationalism and racial aspects of Wagner’s 
dream, as told by Chamberlain, were misinterpreted by the pan-German societies and 
ultranationalists, intoxicated as they were with desires of military glory and imperial 
expansion.  Chamberlain was a published authority on art, music and philosophy, but it was 
through his works on Wagner and the superiority of the Aryan race that he quickly became 
one of the radical right’s nationalist heroes.51 
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The outbreak of war between Germany and Great Britain had a negative effect on 
Chamberlain. He was angry that the country of his birth was at war with the country he loved. 
He wrote essays and pamphlets which incited hatred against the English by claiming that 
Britain’s support for the Entente was a betrayal of the Aryan race.52 His Kriegsaufsätze (‘War 
essays’) was published in English and German, and was reprinted 11 times in 1915. It also 
led the British government to label him a traitor, revoke his British citizenship, and confiscate 
all of his British assets. Chamberlain also promoted anti-Semitism in his wartime writings. In 
1915 he published a second edition of his anti-Semitic work Zuversicht (‘Confidence’). The 
following year he republished a third and revised edition of Arische Weltanschauung (‘Aryan 
world view’), in which he warned his adopted countrymen and -women to defend their 
German values and virtues against foreigners and Jews.
53
 One of Chamberlain’s proudest 
days was in 1916 when his application to become a German citizen was approved. He was, 
writes Brigitte Hamann, ‘very proud to be a “proper German”’.54 
 
Chamberlain’s main intellectual contribution to the postwar debate on German national 
rebirth was the link he forged between Wagner’s doctrine of regeneration—based on an 
authentic German culture that was shaped first and foremost by music—with an elimination 
of all things Jewish. Chamberlain described Wagner’s doctrine of regeneration as being a 
construct of two parts: ‘the negation and the affirmation’. ‘The negative element,’ he 
explained, ‘is the recognition of the decadence; and this forms the foundation for the 
affirmation of the faith in the possibility of regeneration.’55 Chamberlain and other anti-
Semitic German nationalists blamed the Jews for all of Germany’s problems. The Jews, 
Chamberlain and his followers believed, were the decadent and degenerate forces that had 
diluted the German Volk and curtailed the German spirit, stabbed the German army in the 
back, and conspired with the victorious powers after the armistice to destroy the German 
15 
 
people and state. Wagner, proclaimed Chamberlain, had warned of the need to protect the 
German Volk and the German nation from the destructive influences of Jews and foreigners. 
His recommendation was that Jews should ‘be assimilated in us,’ into the noble and 
redeeming German culture ‘in order to be men in common with us.’ Even Chamberlain, 
before the war, acknowledged that Wagner’s proposal for dealing with the ‘Jewish question’ 
was much milder than that demanded by Martin Luther, the German theologian and seminal 
figure in the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation, who urged ‘that the Jews should cease 
to be Jews and if they will not, we will not endure or suffer them with us.’56 
 
Chamberlain invested considerable time and effort identifying and explaining Wagner’s 
concept of regeneration and the unique national character of German art, efforts that were 
lauded after his death during the years of the Third Reich.
57
 He drew most of his evidence 
from essays Wagner wrote between 1879 and 1881. Collectively they addressed Religion and 
Art, and they presented an optimistic outlook for both German regeneration and national 
rebirth. The principal works included: Religion und Kunst (‘Religion and Art’, 1880); Wollen 
wir hoffen? (‘Shall We Hope?’, 1879); Offenses Schreiben an Ernst von Weber, über die 
Vivisektion (‘On vivisection’, 1879); Was nützt diese Erkenntniss? (‘Of what use is this 
knowledge?’, 1880); Erkenne dich Selbst (‘Know thyself’, 1881); and Heldenthum und 
Christenthum (‘The heroic age and Christianity’, 1881). Chamberlain also made regular 
reference to three earlier works: Was ist deutsch? (‘What is German?’, 1865); Deutsche 
Kunst und Deutsche Politik (‘German Art and German Policy’, 1867); and the controversial 
Das Judenthum in der Musik (‘Jewishness in music’, 1850, revised 1869). These earlier 
essays encapsulated the three most important elements identified and reinterpreted by 
Chamberlain in Wagner’s doctrine of regeneration: the unique and regenerative character of 
16 
 
German art, the need for a culturally enlightened national politics, and the constant threat to 
the fulfilment of German greatness posed by the Jews.
58
 
 
Between 1850 and 1881 Wagner wrote numerous letters, essays and longer works in which 
he defined the unique characteristics of German culture, the significance of music to 
unlocking the inexpressible feelings of the Volk, and the political reform that was required to 
reunite the German spirit with the German people to bring about the regeneration and rebirth 
of the German nation.
59
 There was an element of self-promotion throughout his prose works 
designed to secure fame and financial reward, yet he was genuinely passionate about what 
was noble, heroic, and German in his writing and his music. Wagner’s Deutschtum was an 
aesthetic born of genius and will—his genius and the indomitable German spirit.  His essay, 
What is German? saluted the German spirit as the quest for what is beautiful and noble, but it 
also raised a warning that Germans needed to protect their culture from alien elements, 
particularly Jews, otherwise the German spirit would be extinguished. 
 
Wagner also had a political purpose, reaching out to the Volk and providing an enduring 
foundation on which the small and squabbling German principalities and states could finally 
attain national unification. His warning against Jewish influences first appeared in Jewishness 
in Music. All three central themes—the German spirit, the Volk and national unity, and the 
Jewish problem—were repeated in a third major essay, German Art and German Policy. In it 
Wagner added the importance of having a national leader who felt the German spirit and 
understood the value of art in uniting both the people and the nation. He praised the artistic 
achievements of the Bavarian kings, particularly Ludwig I (1825-1848) and Maximilian II 
(1848-1864) for their contributions to German architecture and the plastic arts (painting and 
sculpture), and through the poetic genius of Goethe and Schiller he laid the foundation for his 
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own music dramas that Ludwig II (1864-1886) would subsequently finance in Munich and 
Bayreuth.
60
 Wagner was certain that music, more than any of the other arts, was what enabled 
a German to feel German. His righteous and wise Master Singer, Hans Sachs, declared this 
aphorism in his final aria in Die Meistersinger: ‘Und gebt ihr ihrem Wirken Gunst, zerging’ 
in Dunst das heil’ge röm’sche Reich, uns bliebe gleich die heil’ge deutsche Kunst!’ (‘And if 
you favour their endeavours, even should the Holy Roman Empire dissolve in mist, for us 
there would yet remain holy German Art!’)61 This was the German spirit that gave strength 
and substance to the German nation and would, if properly nurtured, guarantee Germany’s 
resurrection even after the most devastating crises. 
 
A brief summation of Wagner’s ideas does not do justice to either their complexity or the 
variation in their nuances over thirty years of his thinking and writing. This partially explains 
the ease with which Chamberlain, and other anti-Semitic and right wing nationalists, 
interpreted Wagner’s doctrine of regeneration to meet their political needs immediately 
before and after the First World War. Even before the war ended in defeat for Germany, 
Chamberlain believed that it was his patriotic duty to draw on Wagner’s life work to save his 
beloved adopted fatherland. In 1917 Chamberlain along with Heinrich Claβ and Georg von 
Below started a new journal, Deutschlands Erneuerung (‘Germany’s Renewal’), to provide a 
forum for German nationalists and anti-Semitic writers. Chamberlain was already famous in 
these circles for his Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (‘The Foundations of the 
Nineteenth Century’, 1899), which was an important text for the pan-German movement and 
völkisch anti-Semitism. In his postwar writing he added to his anti-Semitism an 
ultranationalist interpretation of Wagner’s doctrine of regeneration, but the combination of 
chronic ill health and a pessimistic disposition left Chamberlain wondering how even the 
indomitable German spirit could lift Germany out of its current state of chaos and 
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humiliation. He feared that art—even the metaphysical transforming art of Richard Wagner—
was not enough to halt the rot that was destroying Germany. German rebirth was only 
possible, Chamberlain reasoned, in a regenerated society, but without the cooperation of art, 
regeneration was unlikely. The answer to his conundrum was an authoritative leader who 
understood the power of art to unite and regenerate. Chamberlain looked longingly, as did 
Cosima and the generals, and an increasing number of Germans, for a saviour, a strong man 
who would lead a renewed Germany back to its rightful position of prominence in the world. 
Chamberlain believed he had found his Führer when he met the Wagner-loving Adolf Hitler 
in October 1923.
62
 
 
Hitler was a Wagnerian from an early age. He was only 12 when he saw Lohengrin, at the 
Linz Landestheater. ‘I was captivated at once,’ he wrote in the opening pages of Mein Kampf. 
‘My youthful enthusiasm for the master of Bayreuth knew no bounds. Again and again I was 
drawn to his works.’63 Hitler’s adolescent aesthetic experience of Wagner was an 
overwhelmingly emotional one, not the intellectual engagement pursued by Chamberlain. 
August (Gustl) Kubizek, Hitler’s boyhood friend in Linz and later his roommate in Vienna, 
recalled how Hitler ‘had a great depth of feeling for music’, and that ‘he preferred a mediocre 
Wagner performance a hundred times to a first-class Verdi.’64 That Hitler shared a deep 
emotive response to Wagner’s music is neither surprising nor unique: it was the reaction 
Nietzsche feared would happen after he heard Tristan und Isolde. In terms of directing the 
fundamental attitudes and decisions in life, Hitler’s response to Wagner’s music was more 
extreme than perhaps anyone else’s, but the significance of Hitler’s youthful experience to his 
later politics should not be underestimated. Kubizek describes the effect that Wagner’s music 
had on Hitler:  
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Listening to Wagner meant to him not a simple visit to the theatre but the opportunity 
of being transported into that extraordinary state which Wagner’s music produced in 
him, that trance, that escape into the mystical dream world which he needed in order 
to sustain the enormous tension of his turbulent nature.
65
 
 
Kubizek further, and controversially, claimed that Hitler’s political awakening occurred in 
Linz in 1905 following a performance of Rienzi, Wagner’s opera about the rise and fall of a 
populist leader in late Medieval Rome. In his memoirs Kubizek devotes an entire chapter to 
his account of Hitler declaring that he was ‘going to be a politician’ on the heights of the 
Freinberg mountain, on the outskirts of Linz, shortly after the two teenagers saw Rienzi. 
Kubizek reminded Hitler of his epiphany when the two attended the Bayreuth Festival in 
1939. Hitler subsequently retold the story to Winifred Wagner, ending it by paraphrasing 
Rienzi – ‘It began at that Moment!’ – and acknowledging the debt he owed to Richard 
Wagner for pointing him in the direction of his political career.
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Ian Kershaw writes that both Kubizek and Hitler embellished this tale and that there is little 
evidence that these events in Linz ever occurred.
67
 It is entirely possible that, as Kershaw 
states, the bizarre account is a melodramatic fantasy, but other more substantial evidence 
exists. It confirms Hitler’s early awareness of Wagner’s political potential in the quest for a 
strong and united Germany. In 1908 Hitler sketched in pencil Wagner’s portrait and beside it 
wrote 12 lines – the first 4 and the last 8 – from Hans Sachs’s famous aria at the end of Die 
Meistersinger (‘Verachtet mir die Meister nicht, und ehrt mir ihre Kunst!’ – ‘Scorn not the 
Masters, I bid you, and honour their art!’), directing any would-be viewer to respect their 
leaders and honour holy German art. Hitler signed this work: ‘To my friend and Wagner 
admirer Gustl Kubizek, Your friend Adolf Hitler.’68 These lines from Die Meistersinger 
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transposed by Hitler onto his artwork for Gustl were the same lines Wagner often used when 
he expressed his own beliefs on the German spirit and the requirements for national 
regeneration. 
 
In addition to his love of Wagner’s music, Hitler, like Chamberlain, was besotted with 
German art, culture, music, architecture, and everything else that was typically German. 
Whilst Mein Kampf cannot be taken as a factually accurate autobiography of Hitler’s life, it 
does provide a glimpse into the Romantic and idealistic imagery that Hitler employed to give 
colour to his political development and passionate expression to his Weltanschauung. Hitler’s 
description of his first visit to Munich illustrates his highly emotional and romanticized style: 
‘there was the heartfelt love which seized me for this city [Munich] more than for any other 
place that I knew, almost from the first hour of my sojourn there. A German city!’  Hitler 
went further with rapturous praise for the city where his political career and National 
Socialism began, and later was venerated by the Nazis as the Hauptstadt der Bewegung 
(capital of the movement). Munich, Hitler claimed, was a ‘metropolis of German art,’ and 
one could not know Germany if ‘one does not know Munich.’ Moreover, ‘one does not know 
German art if one has not seen Munich.’69 Hitler was content in Munich. It was where he—an 
Austrian in Bavaria fantasizing about Germany—felt most German. He felt that the city had a 
German soul, and that it was the true manifestation of German culture.
70
 
 
Defeat in the war and the unacceptable peace agreed to by Ebert and his Social Democrats 
were, for Hitler, obvious symptoms of decay brought about by a cultural decline that had to 
be arrested and reversed if Germany was to recover its greatness or even survive. To ‘master 
this disease’ Bolshevism in all its forms (politics, degenerate art) and all its proponents 
(leftists, socialists, and Jews) had to be resisted and destroyed.
71
 Only a true 
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Volksgemeinschaft based on racial purity and imbued with an authentic German culture, led 
by a heroic leader, could see Germany successfully through this historic struggle.
72
 Hitler saw 
himself as this leader, the combination of Wagner’s mythical hero Siegfried and divine leader 
Parsifal. 
 
It is unlikely that any Müncheners recognised Hitler, an inconspicuous soldier guarding the 
Hauptbahnhof  (the main train station in central Munich) in the summer of 1919, as having 
the potential to become one of Richard Wagner’s Germanic heroes. Hitler’s journey towards 
becoming their Führer began formally on 12 September 1919 at the Sterneckerbräu on the 
Tal in central Munich when he attended a meeting of Anton Drexler’s DAP.73 The account of 
this meeting is well known: Hitler’s initial indifference, his explosive reaction to a fellow 
attendee (Professor Baumann) who advocated Bavarian separatism, and Drexler’s alleged 
remarks: ‘Mensch, der hat a Gosch’n, den kunnt ma braucha’ (‘Goodness, he’s got a gob.  
We could use him’).74 Hitler went expecting to hear Dietrich Eckart, a well-known journalist, 
völkisch poet, and playwright, but Eckart was ill. He was replaced by Gottfried Feder, a pan-
German economic expert, who spoke on ‘the breaking of interest slavery.’75 Hitler was 
familiar with both the speaker and his subject, having recently taken courses at the Ludwig 
Maximilians University where Feder lectured. The meeting, however, was much more 
important to Hitler’s political future than the superficial focus on personalities that has 
attracted so much historical attention. Hitler had come to the attention of the leading political 
agitators in the Thule-Gesellschaft (Thule Society). 
 
The DAP (German Workers’ Party) was established as a new workers’ debating society by 
Karl Harrer, a leading member of the Thule Society, to draw Munich’s working classes away 
from Bolshevism and into the völkisch sphere of public politics. Drexler, ‘a genuine worker,’ 
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was a co-founder and the first ‘party leader.’ The Thule Society was a pre-war anti-Semitic 
völkisch secret society, but the Munich branch only began its formal activities in January 
1918.  Most importantly, it was the first influential organisation to give Hitler assistance.
76
 Its 
founder and leader was Rudolf von Sebottendorf, an occultist, and its insignia was Siegfried’s 
sword Nothung imposed on a Swastika. The Thule Society was based in the luxury hotel Vier 
Jahreszeiten on the Maximilianstraβe, one of the most exclusive streets in Munich. At its 
height membership exceeded 1,500, with influential and wealthy connections throughout the 
highest ranks of Bavarian society. Membership was strictly controlled and members had to 
prove they were of pure ‘Aryan blood.’ Future leaders in the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), Hans Frank, Alfred Rosenberg, and Rudolf Heβ, were members. 
The society’s mandate was to combat the Jewish-Bolshevik terror and promote the rebirth of 
a pure völkisch utopia. The Thule Society also had its own newspaper to promote its ideology 
and political programme, the Münchener Beobachter, which Hitler, with Eckart’s financial 
assistance, purchased for the NSDAP in 1920, and renamed the Völkischer Beobachter (VB). 
The VB was the official paper initially of the party and up to the end of April 1945, when it 
ceased publication, of the National Socialist regime. Between January and June 1921, Hitler 
had 39 articles published in the Völkischer Beobachter, which, along with his many speaking 
engagements in Munich’s bierkellers and the Zirkus Krone, enabled him to present a more 
coherent manifesto and dominate the party. It was at one such public speaking event at the 
Salvatorkeller, in the brewery district of Au-Haidhausen, on 21November 1922, that Ernst 
(Putzi) Hanfstaengl met and decided to support Hitler.
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Hanfstaengl and Eckart were the main associates in Hitler’s growing entourage who 
introduced him to the ‘intellectual aristocrats’ in Munich and Berlin. Hitler quickly gained the 
support of wealthy right-wing sympathisers such as Count Ernst zu Reventlow, the publisher 
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Hugo Bruckmann (Chamberlain’s publisher) and his wife Else, and the famous piano 
manufacturer Edwin Bechstein (Winifred’s guardian) and his wife Helena. Not all of the 
cultured elite appreciated Hitler’s unrefined manners and populist sentiments but Eckart and 
Hanfstaengl convinced them that Hitler was exactly the hard, non-compromising, man-of-the-
people leader that was required.  Helena Bechstein never had any doubts. She was instantly 
captivated by Hitler from the first time Eckart presented him at her salon in Berlin in June 
1921. From that moment she threw herself into supporting him in every possible way—her 
wealth, her contacts, and her reputation—and she did not hesitate to tell her many friends and 
acquaintances that there was hope for the future: at last ‘Germany’s young Messiah’ had been 
found.
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The Bechsteins and Eckart also had summer homes on the Obersalzberg, one of the smaller 
mountains surrounding Berchtesgaden. Hitler was a frequent visitor. He mixed with the 
völkisch musicians, singers, artists and writers high up the mountain on the Vorderbrand, 
where he absorbed the many mythical legends of the region. It was on the Obersalzberg that 
he completed Mein Kampf after his release from Landsberg prison in 1924, and later built the 
Berghof, his private and later, when he was Führer and Reichkanzler, official country 
residence. Before these notorieties occurred, and encouraged by the comforting surroundings 
of this Bavarian mountain idyll, Hitler impressed his hosts with his knowledge and passion 
for Wagner’s ideas and music. Hanfstaengl was impressed by Hitler’s ability to whistle the 
prelude to Meistersinger, ‘every note and completely in tune.’ By 1923 Hitler had also read 
and absorbed Chamberlain’s writings and could quote both the master, Wagner, and his 
biographer, accurately and with ease.
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 On 4 May 1923, during a political speech at the 
Zirkus Krone, Hitler quoted Wagner’s rousing ‘Wach auf’ chorale from Die Meistersinger in 
an emotional appeal for the spiritual mobilisation of the German people in preparation for the 
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inevitable fight against France.
80
 He was enraged by the French occupation of the Ruhr in 
January and the socialist German government’s weak response. Hitler appealed to Helena 
Bechstein precisely because he was a folksy, man of the people whose zeal for Wagner and 
the nationalists’ cause would inspire the masses. Having proven his Wagnerian credentials to 
his wealthy and culturally influential patron, Helena Bechstein, she in turn opened the door to 
Wahnfried, Wagner’s family home and the spiritual headquarters of the Bayreuth Circle.81 
 
Hitler’s first visit to Wahnfried, at the end of September 1923, was an auspicious one. He was 
the principal speaker at German Day in Bayreuth, organised by nationalists and right-wing 
paramilitary groups to protest the French occupation of the Ruhr and the ‘shameful Treaty of 
Versailles.’ Bayreuth’s nationalist mayor, Albert Preu, welcomed the attendees to his ‘old 
town with a world reputation as a centre of art and the home of Wagner.’ He said it was an 
honour to host the German Day but it also brought great responsibility. ‘It is the spirit of 
Siegfried that we need,’ urged Preu, ‘so that like our Master, Richard Wagner, who 
triumphed over all hostile forces, we can once more achieve respect in the world.’82 Hitler’s 
speech was measured and without anti-Semitic slurs. His audience filled the town’s Reithalle 
(riding school) to overflowing, and they applauded often and enthusiastically especially when 
Hitler told them that Germany needed an authoritative leader and that the nation would be 
better when the only German citizens were ‘those who are and feel German.’83 At the end of 
his speech Hitler made a hasty exit.  He was expected by the Wagners at Wahnfried. 
 
Long anticipation of this day made Hitler ill at ease, but when he arrived the Wagners gave 
him a very warm welcome. Winifred, Siegfried, and all the children were present, and they 
showed Hitler through the main rooms of the house.  Hitler paused by one of Wagner’s 
pianos, he was impressed by the large library, and he admired other precious mementoes that 
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celebrated the composer’s career and life. Afterwards and alone he visited Wagner’s tomb at 
the bottom of the large enclosed garden behind the house.  Hitler spent a considerable time in 
contemplation at Wagner’s grave before he returned to the house.  Winifred recalled that he 
‘came back in a state of great emotion, saying, “Out of Parsifal I will make a religion.”’84 
 
After tea, with the family in the garden, Hitler had his long awaited audience with 
Chamberlain.  Confined to a wheelchair and too ill to talk, Chamberlain listened to Hitler’s 
plans to change and rebuild Germany.  A week later he wrote a letter to Hitler telling him that 
he had expected to meet a fanatic but instead he had found a saviour, the key figure of the 
German counter-revolution.
85
 Chamberlain was more than satisfied that Hitler was the man to 
take forward Wagner’s doctrine of regeneration.86 He believed that in Hitler’s hands pure 
German art, enriching and sustaining the indomitable German spirit, would bring about 
Germany’s rebirth. 
 
By the end of October 1923 Hitler had obtained Chamberlain’s blessing and with it the full 
support of Wahnfried and the Bayreuth Circle. Their meeting in Bayreuth was memorialised 
by the Nazis: 
Adolf Hitler and Houston Stewart Chamberlain clasped hands. The great thinker, 
whose writings went with the Führer on his journey and laid the intellectual 
foundations of the Nordic German world-view, the genius, seer and herald of the 
Third Reich, felt that through this simple man of the people Germany’s destiny would 
achieve a glad fulfilment.
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Both Hitler and Chamberlain saw in Wagner a totemic figure that through his life’s work 
could inspire the rebirth of the Germanic people. True national strength and unity, for Hitler, 
came from the cultural heritage of a common ancestry—the shared culture, language, 
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character and blood of the German people. Hitler and Chamberlain believed that Germany’s 
rebirth depended on cultural regeneration. Consequently, Hitler’s dream to create a 
Kulturstaat (culture state) as the first step in restoring Germany’s greatness was both 
endorsed and legitimized by the guardians of Richard Wagner’s life work.88 Moreover, it was 
through Hitler’s appeal to cultural longings, which celebrated and promoted Germanness, that 
he, and the NSDAP as a movement, was able to find a place for and support from all 
segments of German society. 
 
Hitler, Chamberlain, and the cultural elites in Munich and Bayreuth who supported them, 
believed strongly that national unity required a strong national identity, which came from 
being and feeling German. Germany’s failure in the Great War and the grievances and 
suspicions, real or imagined, which emanated from disillusionment with defeat, the 
humiliation of the Versailles Treaty, and the economic and political chaos of the immediate 
post-war years, were attributed by many Germans, as diverse as General Reinhardt and 
Thomas Mann,
89
 to a lack of national unity. Reviving the German spirit, as Hitler told the 
Programme Committee of the new German Workers’ Party in November 1919, not the total 
war ideology advocated by the generals, was the first and most important step to reversing the 
injustices of 1918 and 1919.  If another war had to be fought, then Germany’s future armies 
needed a compelling reason to fight if they were going to fight and win. German art and 
German culture were the crucial components in Hitler’s answer to establishing a strong 
national identity that would also give the nation and the armed forces the necessary will to 
fight to change the political landscape of Europe and restore Germany to its rightful position 
as a great power. 
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Hitler’s failed putsch in front of the Feldherrnhalle in Munich on 9 November 1923 merely 
delayed the implementation of his culturally based policy for Germany’s rebirth. Germany’s 
cultural heritage, for Hitler, Chamberlain, and the cultural elites in Munich and Bayreuth was 
not only evidence of a common ancestry and the foundation for national unity but also proof 
of German superiority. Throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, as National Socialism became a 
more potent political force in Germany, Hitler succeeded in moulding a truly mass movement 
by appealing to the völkisch traditions that attracted people of many different political 
persuasions, inspiring and enlarging his support through a deliberate focus on populist 
sentiments grounded on Germany’s great cultural heritage. It is not a coincidence that after 
Hitler and his National Socialists gained power in January 1933, the first public building 
constructed was an art gallery, the Haus der Deutschen Kunst (House of German Art) in 
Munich. The monumental architecture of Albert Speer’s Reichsparteitagsgelände (Nazi Party 
Rally Grounds) in Nürnberg, the annual exhibitions and festivities of the Days of German Art 
in Munich from 1937 through 1944, and Hitler’s generous and unwavering support for the 
Bayreuth Festival are three of the most expensive and substantial examples of the importance 
Hitler ascribed to art and subsequently of art’s service to the Third Reich.90 Wagner’s music, 
particularly the prelude to Die Meistersinger, was performed at virtually all important party 
and state occasions.
91
 Hitler’s Wagner was an ever present metaphysical voice aestheticizing 
political life in National Socialist Germany—first to regenerate and afterwards to sustain 
public support for the Kampf (struggle) that lay ahead. 
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